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Abstract 
In recent years the topic of intuition has become an important focus of 
attention in psychology.  It is often assumed to be a unitary construct however recent 
research suggests that intuition is multi-faceted.  This paper disaggregates intuition 
by: discriminating between domain-general mechanisms and domain-specific 
processes of intuiting, and primary types of intuition and secondary types of intuition.  
The theoretical relationships between and within processes and types are examined 
and analyzed at behavioral and information processing levels, noting the importance 
in advances in social cognition research.  As a result of this analysis we provide a 
conceptual framework which connects intuitive processes and outcomes.  The paper 
concludes by outlining some of the implications of the framework and in particular 
highlights future methodological challenges faced by intuition researchers in 
laboratory and organizational field settings. 
 
Key words:  dual processing; intuition; information processing; social 
cognition 
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Unpacking Intuition: A Process and Outcome Framework 
Recent years have witnessed an upsurge in intuition research (e.g. Plessner, Betsch, & 
Betsch, 2008; Glöckner & Witteman, 2009).  Despite many notable advances, researchers 
have tended to treat intuition as though it were a unitary construct (e.g. Ambady, 2010; Salas, 
Rosen, & DiazGranados, 2010).  This conceptual problem has not gone un-noticed.  Hogarth 
(2010) stressed the need to identify types of intuition, classify the different mechanisms, 
specify their functions, and thereby “illuminate the conditions under which they are 
functional and dysfunctional for the organism” (p.343).  Doing so has proved to be a 
theoretical and empirical challenge.  Some writers on the subject have proceeded on an 
atheoretic basis offering descriptive and / or prescriptive accounts of intuition in different 
spheres of personal and professional life (e.g. Duggan, 2007) whilst others approached the 
subject from a non-psychological perspective (e.g. Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999).  In the 
organizational behavior field Allinson and Hayes (1996) chose not to ‘unpack’ intuition, 
instead they subsumed it under a general unitary construct of cognitive style.  Within social 
psychology Pacini and Epstein (1999) attempted to disaggregate intuition by distinguishing 
between intuitive ability and intuitive engagement.  Other researchers have sought to 
conceptualize different types of intuition in terms either of intuitive outcome or intuitive 
process (e.g. Dane & Pratt, 2009; Glöckner & Witteman, 2010; Sadler-Smith, 2008, 2010; 
Sinclair, 2010).  Notwithstanding the various advancements that have been made in this 
regard a more integrative approach is now needed which seeks to encompass both outcomes 
and processes.  In this paper we provide a new framework which aims to account for the 
multi-faceted nature of intuition and connects both intuitive processes and outcomes, see 
Figure 1. 
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We begin the paper by providing a defense for pluralism in intuition by exploring why 
intuition is not a unitary concept.  Next we examine distinctions between domain-general and 
domain-specific mechanisms of intuition.  We continue by noting primary and secondary 
types of intuition and recent developments in social cognition.  Thus, our new framework 
serves to more holistically understand the concept of intuition by bringing together disparate 
and seemingly contradictory areas of empirical work, highlighting previously 
unacknowledged connections. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Intuition is not unitary 
Many behavioral and brain scientists accept that two separate systems underlie human 
thinking and reasoning (see Stanovich & West, 2000).  It must be acknowledged there are 
however, notable exceptions to this interpretation; for example a number of behavioral and 
neuro-scientists are now somewhat skeptical of the dual-systems approach and alternatives 
have been advanced.  For example, Kruglanski and Orehek (2007) proposed a ‘quad’ model, 
whilst others have suggested a multi-systems approach focused on the determination of value 
and subsequent choice (see Kable & Glimcher, 2009 for a review).  Nonetheless the dualistic 
partition between modes or systems represents “the dominant conceptual approach” 
(Kruglanski & Orehek, 2007, p.307).  Within many dual-processing frameworks System 1 
thinking and reasoning is hypothesized as evolutionarily the more ancient of the two systems 
(Evans, 2003), its core processes are rapid, parallel, and automatic, permitting judgment in 
the absence of conscious reasoning (Epstein, 1994; Stanovich & West, 2000); System 2 is 
more recent, its core processes are slower, serial, and effortful, permitting conscious abstract 
reasoning and hypothetical thinking (see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Evans, 2008; Schneider 
& Shiffrin, 1977; Wilson, Lindsay, & Schooler, 2000).  To date intuition has been identified 
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as a System 1 process (Stanovich & West, 2000).  The aim of this paper is to elaborate on the 
claim that “further useful distinctions [are] to be made within the two processes of dual 
models” (Hogarth, 2010, p.342 italics added) on the basis that System 1 “contains many 
subsystems” (Hogarth, 2001, p.209) and that it is “almost certainly wrong to think of System 
1 as one system” (Evans, 2008, p.17).  Indeed Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj and Heier (1996, 
p.403) postulated that just as mathematical, verbal and abstract logic comprise rational 
processing (i.e. System 2), there may also be “several experiential [System 1] abilities, such 
as visualization, imagination, and aesthetic sensibility” (i.e. System 1).  Thus, the unpacking 
of intuition to an extent echoes the multi-systems approach emerging within neuroscience. 
The idea of intuition as non-unitary is not new, for example Wild (1938) distinguished 
between aesthetic, moral, and religious intuitions, but the usefulness of a number of the older 
classifications is now doubtful (e.g. Cappon, 1994; Vaughan, 1979).  Also, Dane and Pratt 
(2007) noted that a confusing aspect of intuition research has been a tendency to call intuitive 
processes and associated outcomes ‘intuition’, they suggested that intuition is better 
conceptualized in terms of its process (the mechanisms and processes of intuiting) and its 
outcome (types of intuition).  Table 1 outlines a further refinement of this distinction, i.e. 
within intuiting (domain-general mechanisms and domain-specific processes), and between 
intuitions (primary types and secondary types). 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
Domain-general mechanisms of intuiting 
Accepting that “intuitions are affectively charged judgments which arise rapidly 
through non-conscious, holistic associations” (Dane & Pratt, 2007, p.40) three domain-
general mechanisms of intuiting are posited: the application of heuristics under conditions of 
uncertainty; the acquisition and activation of complex domain-relevant schemas; the infusion 
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of affect into decision making.  The distinction between domain-generality and domain-
specificity in the context of intuition draws on Chiappe and MacDonald’s general set of 
assertions: (1) without domain-general mechanisms humans would be unable to solve 
recurrent problems in novel ways; (2) domain-specific mechanisms are insufficient of 
themselves; (3) domain-general mechanisms are central to human cognition, and necessary in 
order for human beings to be able to “cope with life in a constantly changing world” (2005, 
p.10). 
This stance towards domain-generality assumes that there are certain preset goals that 
System 1 was designed, by evolution, to solve.  Hence , humans possess evolved motivational 
systems that “provide positively or negatively valenced [affective] signals” that help to solve 
problems by narrowing down the array of possible solutions in situations where there may be 
a large number of behavioral choices (including solutions that worked well in the past) 
through automatic, unconscious processing (see Chiappe & MacDonald, 2005, p.7). 
First we examine heuristics as a source of errors and biases under conditions of 
uncertainty.  We concur with the view that systematic biases accrue in human judgment as a 
result of a number of fallacies and intuitive errors in information processing (Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).  Intuitive judgments - at least in the heuristics and biases tradition - 
are “thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without much reflection” 
occupying a position between the automatic operations of perception and the deliberative 
operations of reasoning (Kahneman, 2002, p.449).  Later developments in this program of 
research highlighted that a number of important biases and framing effects in judgment and 
decision making accrue from an affect heuristic (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 
2004).  Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson (2000) offered evidence from experimental 
studies for an inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefits based on the 
role of affect in judging the risks and benefits of specific hazards (e.g. nuclear power).  Under 
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time-pressured conditions reliance on affect was enhanced; for example, providing 
information designed to alter the favourability of participants’ overall affective evaluation of 
nuclear power systematically changed risk/benefit judgments.  Finucane et al. (2000) 
concluded that people draw intuitively on an affect heuristic which improves the efficiency of 
judgments by deriving risk/benefit evaluations from a common source, i.e. their ‘gut feel’ 
reactions.  Slovic and colleagues asserted that in intuiting individuals draw on an affect pool 
containing “all the positive and negative [affective] tags associated with the representations 
consciously or unconsciously” (Finucane, et al., 2000, p.3).  The affect heuristic confers 
irrationality on some aspects of judgment, but it can also offer strong advantages particularly 
in relation to interpreting subtle social cues communicating tacit knowing (De Martino, 
Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). 
Evolutionarily, heuristics are adaptive for survival in relevant ancestral environments 
(e.g. the concepts of Homo heuristicus and ‘the adaptive toolbox’, Gigerenzer & Brighton, 
2009) but are an ineffective means for dealing with statistical and probability-based problems 
(e.g. Wason selection task) in modern environments (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).  Certain types 
of heuristics may be seen as a computational malfunction attributable to an inherent 
limitation of System 1 processing which operates maladaptively under particular conditions 
in non-ancestral (i.e. present day) environments.  An alternative view is that heuristics are 
neither irrational nor a-rational, they are ‘natural assessments’ and “sensible estimation 
procedures” based on sophisticated underlying processes (e.g. retrieval and matching) in 
response to fairly simple questions posed under conditions of uncertainty, rather than 
assessments for complex judgmental problems (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p.3).  Indeed 
Gilovich and Griffin are keen to point out that in the heuristics and biases tradition decision 
makers are seen typically through a ‘cognitive miser’ lens (i.e. humans as conservators of 
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mental effort).  A natural assessments view ought to be consolidated as being “what the 
heuristics and biases program is really about” (2002, p.16). 
Second, we explore complex domain-relevant schemas (CDRS) as bases for intuitive 
judgment under conditions of complexity and/or time pressure: System 1 processing is 
autonomous (its execution is rapid and mandatory when triggering stimuli are encountered), 
is not under conscious control or dependent on concurrent inputs from the analytic system 
(Toplak, Liu, Macpherson, Toneatto, & Stanovich, 2007).  System 1 processing is triggered 
by, and enables the solution of, problems that have recurrent features and involves 
deployment of complex domain-relevant schemas (CDRS) (Klein, 1993, Klein, et al., 1995).  
CDRSs are comprised of a web of declarative and procedural knowledge acquired through 
learning and supported by practice and feedback in environments conducive to the 
development of effective performance (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Hogarth, 2010; Lipshitz, Klein, 
Orasanu, & Salas, 2001).  For individuals to develop the requisite CDRSs in occupational 
domains they need to engage in deliberate, motivated, and repetitive practice over the long-
term (Ericsson & Charness, 1994) in simulated and field settings with expert feedback that 
allows them to “learn the appropriate lessons from experience” in ‘kind’ learning 
environments (Hogarth, 2001, p.90).  Individuals may acquire such knowledge through 
exposure to prototypes, observational learning (Epstein, 2008) and social interaction, even 
though they may not be able to articulate the tacit knowledge and implicit understanding 
acquired (Nadler, Thompson, & van Boven, 2003).  Based on a summary of current models 
of intuition Glöckner and Witteman (2010, p.1) proposed a “categorization according to the 
underlying cognitive processes” of four mechanisms of learning, retrieval, and integration 
which support the role of CDRSs in intuiting, namely: associative (including classical and 
operant conditioning); matching (including the acquisition of prototypes); accumulative 
(including accumulation of evidence based on quick automatic processes such as matching); 
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constructive (including automatic construction of mental representations and coherence 
shifts). 
The acquisition of CDRSs is pertinent not only to the problem-solving intuitions 
typical of expert performance, also prolonged exposure and learning in a specific socio-
cultural setting may produce an intuitive facility for moral or social judgment as product of 
domain-general learning mechanisms (Almor, 2003).  For example, Sonenschein (2007) 
argued that managers with little experience in arriving at moral judgments may have few 
intuitions about ethical issues, but as a result of exposure and experience (and the acquisition 
of moral and ethical prototypes) over the longer term they become more able to rely on 
intuitions which have captured past experiences.  An implication of this is that unethical 
behaviors in organizations may be more typical of novices rather than experts, the latter are 
likely to have acquired well-honed virtues whereas the former “struggle with applying the 
right rule in [complex and ambiguous] situations requiring many rules” (Sonenschein, 2007, 
p.1033). 
Third, we note somatic markers as sources for the infusion of affect under conditions 
of risk as a third possible domain-general mechanism of intuiting.  Affect infusion is a 
process whereby “affectively loaded information exerts an influence on, and becomes 
incorporated into, cognitive and judgmental processes” (Forgas, 2001, p.101).  The somatic 
marker hypothesis (SMH) (Damasio, 1999) provides a systems-level neuro-anatomical 
account for the infusion of affect into risk-based decision-making the mechanisms of which 
occur at a non-conscious level.  The SMH is posited on the principle that “decision-making is 
a process that is influenced by [somatic] marker signals that arise in bio-regulatory processes, 
including those that express themselves in emotions and feelings” (Bechara & Damasio, 
2005, p.336). 
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The origins of the SMH may be traced to experiments that compared the performance 
on a simulated high-risk gambling task of normal participants with that of patients with 
damage to the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPC, implicated in the induction of 
emotions).  The essence of the SMH is that a pattern of somatic and visceral signals from the 
body act as marker signals (a warning signal when negatively valenced) and guide (e.g. by 
narrowing) decision-making in advance of conscious awareness based upon previous 
experiences (Bechara, 2004).  On the basis of Dane and Pratt’s (2007) definition of intuition 
(i.e. it is ‘affectively charged’) such autonomous ‘narrowing signals’ may themselves be 
classified in terms of the valence of the associated affect (positive or negative, signaling 
‘approach’ or ‘avoid’ behaviors respectively) and intensity, (high [‘hot’] or low [‘cold’]), i.e. 
‘hot approach’, ‘hot avoid’, ‘cold approach’, and ‘cold avoid’ gut feelings (see Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999).  Indeed Haidt (2004) has argued that it is incorrect to contrast affect and 
cognition, preferring instead two kinds of cognition “hot and cold” (p.286).  Somatic markers 
can serve as a neurobiological ‘alarm’ mechanism or a ‘beacon’ of incentive (which may or 
may not be consciously apprehended) in the selection of ‘good’ responses over ‘bad’ ones in 
terms of “survival versus [exposure to] danger” (Damasio, 1996, p.1417) thereby sustaining 
adaptive avoid/approach behaviors.  For a critical review of the SMH see Dunn, Dalgleish, 
and Lawrence (2006). 
We now proceed with a discussion of how our framework encapsulates primary types 
of intuition (i.e. the outcomes of the process of intuiting). 
Primary types of intuition 
The mechanisms of intuiting described above are domain-general - they operate 
automatically across domains on the basis of the complexity, uncertainty, and level of risk 
associated with a triggering event.  There are also a number of specific processes which 
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pertain to particular domains (‘domain-specific processes’) see Table 2.  We discuss four 
intuition-relevant domains: problem-solving, creativity, moral judgment (Dane & Pratt, 2009; 
Haidt, 2001; Klein, 2003; Reynolds, 2006; Sinclair, 2010; Sonenschein, 2007), and social 
judgment (Almor, 2003; Ambady, 2010; Myers, 2001).  These recur across a wide variety of 
occupational and non-occupational settings.  Each primary type (as distinct from secondary 
types, see ‘Concluding Remarks’ below) will be described and analyzed in terms of: 
definition; behavioral description; domain-specific information processing mechanisms; 
neural correlates – see Table 2. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Problem-solving intuition 
Definition:  Domain-specific, expertise-based response to a tightly-structured 
problem based on non-conscious processing of information, activated automatically, eliciting 
matching of complex patterns of multiple cues against previously acquired prototypes and 
scripts held in long-term memory. 
Behavioral description: Dane and Pratt (2009) described this type of intuition as 
pattern matching “honed through repeated training and practice” (2009, p.5).  Such intuition 
is deployed typically by experts in order to deal with tightly-specified problems in particular 
domains.  Dane and Pratt (2009) refer to it as ‘problem-solving intuition’ rather than 
‘intuition-as-expertise’ (Hogarth, 2001) or ‘intuitive expertise’ (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  
Problem-solving intuitions are triggered by tightly-structured decisions and problems 
requiring convergent solutions, for example, Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) 
researchers such as Klein and his colleagues have studied complex, time pressured, high-
stakes decisions such as whether or not and how to evacuate a burning building, or if and how 
intervene in a medical emergency. 
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In the 1980s Klein and his co-researchers developed a recognition-primed decision 
(RPD) model based on: (1) narrative accounts of complex, time-pressured decisions taken by 
experienced fireground commanders’ which did not fit into explicit decision-tree, multi-
attribute, or optimal choice models; (2) the possibility that “fireground commanders were 
contrasting alternatives, but at an unconscious level” (Klein, 1993, p.139); (3) the deployment 
of intuition in environments in which there is inadequate information, where goals are unclear 
and procedures are poorly defined, where cue learning enables patterns to be perceived and 
distinctions to be made, and where conditions are dynamic (Klein, 2003). 
The decision makers studied by RPD researchers, (for example, firefighters, neo-natal 
nurses, and missile battery commanders) operated in time-pressured, complex, life-or-death 
situations where there was little or no time to compute multiple options, therefore they used 
their experience to ‘size-up’ situations, get a sense of typicality, recognize a course of action 
that matched a prototype, and implement it.  Effective intuitive problem-solving that is 
capable of yielding judgments that are consistent, valid and reliable over the longer term 
depend upon prior experience, learning, and feedback upon which the capacity for rapid 
response through recognition is built (Simon, 1987).  However, RPD strategies are unlikely to 
be productive or necessary in computational-type tasks, where justifications are required and 
where the views of different stakeholders have to be taken into account (Lipshitz, Klein, 
Orasanu, & Salas, 2001). 
Information processing mechanisms.  Based on research that had its inception in a 
series of small-scale experiments on the role of ‘chunking’ in chess and on a body of 
empirical evidence indicative that expert decision makers rely on a process of pattern 
recognition which is unavailable to novices (Simon & Chase, 1973), Simon summarily 
described “intuition and judgment - at least good judgment...” as “...simply analyses frozen 
into habit and into the capacity for rapid response through recognition” (1987, p.63).  
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Following in the tradition of Simon’s seminal contribution NDM researchers are concerned 
with understanding and improving decision making as it pertains to complex judgmental 
tasks undertaken by experienced participants in field settings (as opposed to naïve 
participants in laboratory settings, Salas & Klein, 2001; see also Gore et al, 2006), i.e. 
‘intuition-as-expertise’ (Hogarth, 2001) or more latterly ‘intuitive expertise’ (Kahneman & 
Klein, 2009). 
Central to the RPD model are learned holistic associations based on prototypes that 
enable an experienced decision maker to gain an acute awareness of a situation based on 
relevant cues (compared to a novice who might devote scarce mental resources to 
irrelevancies), deploy action scripts (activated by meaningful patterns of cues based on 
similarity to previously-encountered situations), mentally simulate the deployment of a given 
script (based on mental models), take the necessary actions (based on requisite levels of 
skill), and accomplish the whole process “in an instant and without conscious thought” (Klein 
2003, p.14).  However, expertise and intuitions are not synonymous: “there are mechanisms 
of expert decision-making performance that involve intuitive processing and those that 
involve deliberative processing” (Salas, et al., 2010, p.10).  Kahneman and Klein (2009) 
argued that the determination of whether or not an intuitive judgment can be trusted depends 
on the validities of task environments and participants’ learning.  High-validity environments 
are characterized by stable relationships between objectively-identifiable cues and subsequent 
events, or between cues and the outcomes of possible actions.  The latter may often be the 
case in medicine and fire-fighting in situations involving expert participants, but not in 
predicting the future value of individual stocks, or long-term political forecasting (Kahneman 
& Klein, 2009).  High-validity environments allied to prolonged practice and timely and 
unequivocal feedback (Hogarth, 2001) are necessary for the development of expert (i.e. 
‘well-informed’) intuitions. 
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Neural correlates:  As far as the neural bases of pattern recognition are concerned, 
evidence is emerging from laboratory studies which may form the basis of an improved 
understanding of expertise-based intuition as it occurs in field settings.  Inferences are 
tentative at this stage but provide foundations for further work.  For example, the complex 
spatial representations deployed in expert navigation by London cab drivers was found to be 
associated with greater posterior hippocampal gray matter volume (Maguire, Woollett, & 
Spiers, 2006).  Campitelli, Gobet and Parker’s (2005) study of expertise in chess 
“strengthen[ed] the hypothesis that when performing a domain-specific task experts activate 
different brain systems from that of novices” (p.238).  Domain-specific information stored in 
the temporal lobes supports quick recognition (Campitelli, Gobet, Head, Buckley & Parker, 
2007).  Bar, et al. (2006) suggested that the role of the brain’s frontal cortex is to provide an 
initial ‘guess’ at recognition which serves to limit the number of options to be considered.  
This activation occurs prior to activation in the brain regions involved in object recognition.  
Such processes are advantageous to the extent that they enable a quick response to be 
generated based on an initial extraction of the ‘gist’ of a stimulus in situations characterized 
by time pressure and/or insufficient information.  The costs of acting erroneously on the basis 
of such an initial judgment based on limited information are likely to be outweighed by the 
costs of not acting on such information at all, hence fast responses based on a crude ‘gist 
extraction’ are likely to have been adaptive in ancestral environments (see Le Doux, 1996).  
Volz and von Cramon (2006) used fMRI to study brain regions involved in intuitive 
judgments of patterns of visual coherence, and found that the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC), 
amygdala, and other brain regions, including the ventral occipito-temporal (VOT) regions, 
were activated autonomously in coherence judgments, even when participants were unable to 
explicitly name the stimulus.  In summary: ‘upstream’ processes may provide initial 
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interpretations for use by ‘downstream’ brain regions (Volz & von Cramon, 2006) in arriving 
at quick assessment via the extraction of the gist of a situation (see Brainerd & Reyna, 1990). 
Creative intuition 
Definition.  Slow-to-form affectively-charged judgment occurring in advance of an 
insight that combines knowledge in novel ways based on divergent associations, and which 
orients behavior in a direction that may lead to a creative outcome. 
Behavioral description.  Creativity involves the generation of new and valued ideas, 
and psychologists have been concerned traditionally with the cognitive processes leading up 
to idea generation.  There is a body of narrative and experimental evidence which supports 
the view that creative breakthroughs are often presaged by an incubation phase in which 
intimations, and ‘feelings of knowing’ (Heli & Sun, 2010; Koriat, 1993) are experienced in 
the lead-up to the moment of insight (Davidson, 1995).  Hence, creative intuition is the 
subjective experience of phenomena often referred to as ‘vibes’, ‘hunches’ or ‘gut feelings’ 
which may intimate an impending insight.  The role of such intimatory phenomena, which 
typically are positively valenced, is attested to by many well-documented examples in the 
history of scientific discoveries and technical advancements (Gruber, 1995; Sundgren & 
Styhre, 2004) and artistic achievements (Claxton, 2001; Harvey, 1999). 
One potential source of confusion relates to the fact that insight and intuition are not 
the same (Hogarth, 2010), however they are closely related most notably in the domain of 
creativity to the extent that a creative intuition segues to an explicit insight at the so-called 
‘eureka moment’.  Creative intuitions provide a visceral sense interpreted as an intimation 
(literally ‘an announcement’) that a conjecture (such as a hypothesis, sketch, or plan) may 
work even though formal evaluation of its viability may be some way off (Gick & Lockhart, 
1995).  Creative intuitions differ from problem-solving intuitions principally in that they are 
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slower and the latter do not necessarily combine knowledge in novel ways, but instead rely 
upon convergence between an observed pattern and a prototype held in long-term memory 
(Salas et al., 2010).  Hence, unlike problem-solving intuitions, the nature of associations in 
creative intuitions is divergent rather than convergent (Dane & Pratt, 2009). 
Creative intuitions, in which knowledge is combined in divergent, holistic, and novel 
ways support scientific discovery, technical invention, business venturing, and artistic 
endeavor (Claxton, 2001; Dorfman, Shames, & Kihlstrom, 1996; Miller & Ireland, 2005; 
Policastro, 1995).  Creative intuitions are conjectures, they signal directions of divergent 
thinking that might turn out to be fruitful, but also which might be ‘blind alleys’ and in 
common with intuitive judgments more generally have their attendant uncertainties. 
A number of theories of creativity have identified cognitive styles as an important 
variable “essential to creativity” (Kaufman & Baer, 2009, p.87) and which influence different 
phases of decision processes (Hunt, Krzystofiak, Meindl, & Yousry, 1989).  For example, 
individual differences in Kirton’s adaption-innovation (A-I) cognitive style are associated 
with differing levels of creativity (Goldsmith, 1994), while the Type I intellectual style 
identified by Zhang and Sternberg (2009) is defined as being holistic, intuitive, divergent, and 
creativity-generating.  Individual differences in cognitive style moderate the relationship 
between intuitive processes and intuitive outcomes (Simonton, 1980) to the extent that 
CDRSs are a necessary but insufficient condition for creativity (for example, in business 
venturing creative entrepreneurs also need be in possession of relevant expertise – see 
Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999), it is also necessary to be able to make divergent associations 
(Policastro & Gardner, 1999) through styles of processing variously labeled as innovative 
(Kirton, 1976), intuitive (Allinson & Hayes, 1996) or Type 1 (Zhang & Sternberg, 2009).  
Recent empirical evidence shows that an intuitive cognitive style is positively associated with 
the creative aspects of entrepreneurship (Kickul, Gundry, Barbosa & Whitcanack, 2009). 
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Information processing mechanisms.  Autonomous neural activations are 
implicated in the inter-related, but sometimes conflated, processes of incubation, insight and 
intuiting (Dorfman, et al., 1996).  The origins of the notion of incubation are traceable at least 
as far back as Wallas’ (1926) model of creativity and problem-solving which he based on 
studies of the narrative accounts of a number of scientific discoveries.  The model comprises 
four sequential stages: preparation, incubation, intimation, and illumination, and is well-
documented elsewhere (Sternberg & Davidson, 1995).  From the perspective of analyzing 
creative intuition, the intimation stage of the model is most relevant: Wallas described it as 
transitory sensations presaging an impending insight, a “fringe consciousness of an 
association-train is in the state of rising consciousness which indicates that the fully 
conscious flash of success is coming” (1926, p.97). 
Wallas’ model is a classic view of unconscious incubation involving activations 
beneath the threshold of awareness which are slow and spreading (Dorfman, et al., 1996; 
Yaniv & Meyer, 1987).  Moreover, creative intuition is unique amongst types of intuition in 
being the result of relatively slow or suspended non-conscious processing of information 
(Claxton, 2006). 
Neural correlates:  Spreading activation across neural networks (Yaniv & Meyer, 
1987) and levels of activation achieving threshold levels such that they enter into conscious 
awareness (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990) provide plausible neural level 
explanations for the phenomenon of creative intuition.  Jung-Beeman, et al. (2004) mapped 
differences in neural activity between insight and non-insight problems, and observed that 
increased activations in the anterior superior temporal gyrus (aSTG) of the right hemisphere 
(RH) occurred at the moment of insight.  The aSTG region facilitated the integration of 
information across wide semantic networks (enabling problem solvers to make remote 
connections through divergent, diffuse, and overlapping activations), whereas the neural 
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circuitry in the same region of the left hemisphere produced narrower, more discrete fields of 
activation.  Positive mood supported the spread of neural activation to remote associates in 
memory (promoting a holistic processing mode), whilst negative mood restricted the spread 
of activation (promoting a serial processing mode) (Bolte, Goschke, & Kuhl, 2003).  This is 
consistent with the finding that participants in positive moods demonstrated divergent 
thinking, made unusual associations and performed well on insight problems (George & 
Zhou, 2007). 
Social intuition 
Definition.  Rapid and automatic evaluation of another person’s cognitive and/or 
affective state through the perception and non-conscious processing of verbal and/or non-
verbal indicators. 
Behavioral description.  The ability to detect important social attributes of 
conspecies, for example their willingness as potential partners in valuable behaviors such as 
cooperation or mating, could confer reproductive advantage and therefore be more likely to 
spread through a population (Almor, 2003, p.105).  This capacity to identify rapidly and 
automatically with the mental states, motives, feeling states, and intentions of others is 
described by Myers (2002, p.33) thus: “When meeting a stranger in the forest, one had to 
instantly assess whether that person was friend or foe”, and individuals who were able to do 
so and act accordingly “were more likely to survive and leave descendents”.  Whether or not 
another individual is ‘friend’ (evoking a positively-valenced intuition signaling attraction) or 
‘foe’ (evoking a negatively-valenced intuition signaling avoidance) presents a tightly-
structured problem, and is an analogue for many social interactions and judgments that occur 
in occupational settings (such as selection interviews, negotiations, co-worker preferences, 
and group dynamics). 
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Within the area of social psychology dual process models continue to be developed. 
Social psychologists such as Smith and DeCoster (2000) suggest that generally three 
components are evident: reports of how people process in a ‘quick and dirty’ fashion; how 
they process when they have completed extensive thought; and an exploration of what 
conditions facilitate effortless processing.  Smith and DeCoster (2000) note that dual-process 
models in social and cognitive psychology overlap and they propose a new model which links 
these areas by examining underlying memory systems.   They argue that the underlying dual 
processing modes are qualitatively different types of processing.  For example, they note that 
stereotypes may be held in a slow-learning memory system in spite of people who may deny 
those beliefs.   They suggest two processing modes which are ‘associative’ and ‘rule-based’ 
(Sloman, 1996; Smolensky, 1988) and draw on two different memory systems, something 
which further research on cognition may do well to consider (e.g. the relative merits of 
unconscious thought, Dijksterhuis, 2004). 
The evolutionary and neural bases, and ontogenetic trajectories of ‘hard-wired’ social 
intuition are uncertain at present (Singer, 2006), but it is argued that a system of reasoning 
goals, perceptions, and emotions develops in the first two years of life (Saxe, Carey, & 
Kanwisher, 2004), and that people can and do express implicit attitudes that are activated 
automatically the basis for which is unknown to them but which influence implicit responses 
as part of a dual-attitude system (Wilson, Lindsay, & Schooler, 2000).  As studies of implicit 
prejudice and intuitive fears illustrate (Myers, 2002), intuitive social judgments can be 
accurate but also are prone to errors and biases and may lead us astray (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Nisbett & Ross, 1980).  Intuitive social judgments are accompanied by a 
relatively high level of affective charge (Adolphs & Damasio, 2001), and the rules of 
inference are relatively closed to introspective access (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  In common 
with moral intuitions (see below), social intuitions are shaped by the socio-cultural context in 
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which they develop.  For example, Myers (2002, p.47) speculated that women are seemingly 
“more empathic, more sensitive to nonverbal cues, and more relational” than men, and that 
their higher levels of social intuition may be as a result of an interaction between genetic (as a 
result of evolutionary pressures) and socio-cultural factors (females are expected by certain 
cultures or societies to be more empathic and relational) (see Allinson & Hayes, 2000).  
There have been mixed findings in relation to, for example in relation to the stereotype of 
‘female intuition’ (Allinson & Hayes, 1996), but the extent to which this is a result of 
researchers failing to disaggregate intuition (i.e. treating as a unitary construct) warrants 
further investigation. 
Information processing mechanisms.  Empirical evidence for the processes 
underlying ‘impressionistic’ intuitive social judgments may be found in a number of related 
studies initiated by Ambady and her colleagues in the early 1990s (for a summary see 
Ambady, 2010, p.271).  These researchers observed that ratings by complete strangers based 
on evaluative ‘thin slices’ (video clips between two- and ten-seconds in length) of teachers’ 
non-verbal behaviors predicted with high levels of accuracy the ratings of the same teachers 
by students who had interacted with them substantially, these researchers also reported 
correlations between thin slice judgments and real-life criterion variables (Ambady & 
Rosenthal, 1993).  Other thin slice research has found that the effectiveness of sales managers 
(as measured by supervisors’ evaluations and actual sales) can be assessed accurately using 
thin slices of the vocal channel of communication, and that thin slices generally are more 
valuable for assessing inter-personal rather than non-interpersonal task-related skills 
(Ambady & Krabbenhoft, 2006).  Other examples of correlations between intuitive thin slice 
judgments and criterion measures include: surgeons’ rated as domineering on audio thin 
slices were more likely to have been sued for malpractice in the past (Ambady, La Plante, 
Nguen, Rosenthal, & Levinson, 2002); physical therapists’ who were rated on video thin 
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slices as distancing themselves from patients (for example by not smiling or by looking 
away) were more likely to have clients whose physical and mental functioning showed long-
term decline (Ambady, Koo, Rosenthal & Winograd, 2002). 
Social intuitions are difficult to consciously control, for example while it may be 
possible to consciously and effortfully manipulate the content of the verbal channel, states 
such as anxiety are communicated implicitly and effortlessly through tone, pitch, and gesture 
and are evaluated intuitively (DePaulo, 1992) (by contrast, skilled liars are able to manipulate 
the verbal and non-verbal channels of communication, Porter, et al., 2008).  Lieberman 
(2000, p.111) described the intuitive encoding and decoding of mental states as a “compelling 
example of intuitive social action” with implications for the understanding of script-based 
inferences (based on culturally-agreed orders of events in social interactions), distributed 
decision making, automatic evaluations, and other social inference processes which are 
relatively closed to introspection.  The nature of associations involved in intuitive social 
judgments is divergent and broad, based on the integration of multiple sources of information 
from multiple channels (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993; DePaulo, 1992). 
Neural correlates: According to Adolphs and Damasio there is “something of a 
consensus that the amygdala is critical to the recognition of emotions from facial 
expressions” (2001, p.40).  Lieberman (2005) has observed that current theories and methods 
in behavioral science cannot give a satisfactory account of why some automatic social 
judgments, such as thin slices, can be highly accurate while others are systematically 
inaccurate.  In an attempt to understand the nature of intuition-based self knowledge 
Lieberman, Jarcho, and Satpute (2004) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
to examine the neural correlates of intuition-based and evidence-based self-knowledge.  
Intuition-based judgements produced activations in “a network of neural structures called the 
X-system, involved in automatic social cognition” whereas evidence-based judgments 
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“produced activations in a network called the C-system, involved in effortful social cognition 
and propositional thought” (p.421). 
The information processing and neural mechanisms of the C-system (lateral prefrontal 
cortex, medial temporal lobe, and medial parietal cortex, see Lieberman, 2007) are 
considered to yield analytically reasoned judgments; whereas those of the X-system 
(amygdala, ventro-medial pre-frontal cortex (VMPC [cf. somatic marker hypothesis above]), 
and basal ganglia, see Lieberman, 2007) are considered to yield intuitive judgments.  
According to Reynolds (2006, p.740) the C-system’s rule-based analysis and active judgment 
has the potential to intervene, exercise executive control over, and “micromanage” the X-
system.  Lieberman (2005) suggested that social cognitive neuroscience (SCNS) may be in a 
good position to “tease apart the different forms of automatic social cognition” (p.752) in 
terms of the workings of the X-system. 
Other cognitive neuroscientific explanations for intuitive empathic perception and 
judgment include the neural mechanisms associated with Von Economo and mirror neurons.  
On the basis that visceral intuitive responses enable quick reactions in social situations 
characterized by high uncertainty, Allman, Watson, Tetreault and Hakeem (2005) theorized 
that Von Economo neurons (VENs, also referred to as ‘spindle neurons’), which are found 
only in humans and great apes, emerge mainly after birth, and reach their adult number by 
age four years, play an important role in intuitive social judgment.  VENs may relay fast 
assessments of complex social situations thus allowing quick evaluations and rapid 
adjustments of behavior.  They may have been selected for as an adaptation to the increased 
gregariousness and intensity of social interactions that have characterized latter stages of 
human phylogeny, specifically a need to quickly and effortlessly judge others’ levels of 
altruism, empathy, and trustworthiness (Allman, et al., 2005).  A ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) 
enables an individual to “attribute independent metal states to self and others in order to 
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explain and predict behavior” (Frith & Happé, 1994, p.116).  Lieberman argued that the 
“sense of experiencing other minds appears to recruit brain regions more closely tied with 
automatic and affective processes” (2007, p.265) and that the lateral temporal cortex in 
particular supports automatic and non-reflective aspects of ToM (2009, p.21).  Other 
researchers have suggested that disorders such as autism (‘mind blindness’) may be related to 
failure of VENs to develop normally (Allman, et al., 2005). 
Mirror neurons are found in the frontal cortices of humans and apes, and are involved 
in motor cognition – they fire in response both to performing an action (such as grasping) and 
to the action being observed, i.e. they show congruence between the visual actions they 
respond to and the motor responses they code (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  Evidence for 
the involvement of mirror neurons in emotional interpersonal cognition can be found in 
studies of mirror neuron activation in tasks relying on empathic abilities without task-related 
motor components (Schulte-Rüther, Markowitsch, Fink, & Piefke, 2007).  Mirror neurons 
have been posited as playing an important role in non-verbal communication between 
interaction partners and the intuitive judgment of the behavior, intentions, and experiences of 
others (Lieberman, 2007), but this has yet to be demonstrated empirically.  The mirror neuron 
system (MNS) offers a promising account for the processes whereby humans perceive others 
empathically (being ‘like me’ in the eyes of the observer) and allow us to “use the same 
systems that process knowledge about self-performed actions, self-conceived thoughts, and 
self-experienced emotions to understand actions, thoughts, and emotions in others” (Oberman 
& Ramachandran, 2007, p.310). 
Moral intuition 
Definition.  Automatic, rapid, affect-based judgment made in response to an ethical 
dilemma, arrived at non-consciously, rationalized post-hoc, and relatively impervious to 
disconfirmation (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Sonenschein, 2007). 
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Behavioral description.  Contrary to traditional rationalist theories of moral 
judgment, the concept of moral intuition draws on Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model 
(SIM) of moral judgment based on the precept that individuals act like ‘intuitive moral 
attorneys’ (Sonenschein, 2007) who search for confirmatory evidence for their initial 
intuitions (i.e. ‘gut feel’ reactions to a moral dilemma).  The SIM is ‘intuitionist’ in that it 
states that “moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations 
(intuitions)” (Haidt, 2001, p.814).  It is consistent with a view of moral judgment as involving 
non-conscious pattern matching accompanied by a relatively high level of affective charge, 
i.e. reasoning is a post-hoc attribution (Monin, Pizzaro, & Beer, 2007) thereby creating an 
illusion of control (Dane & Pratt, 2009; Sonenschein, 2007).  In an experimental study using 
a deliberative ethical decision-making task Marquardt and Hoeger (2009) found that 
managers’ implicit (intuitive) moral attitudes exercised an important influence on their 
decision-making; they concluded that complex and deliberative decision-making processes in 
the context of business ethics are significantly affected by implicit moral attitudes.  Even 
though individuals may ascribe their moral judgments and behaviors to rationality, 
intuitionist theories suggest that “individuals first use intuitions and then use post-hoc (moral) 
reasoning” (Sonenschein, 2007, p.1027).  These ‘emotion-backed’ concerns about social 
interactions (i.e. moral intuitions) are a result of evolution “equipping [Homo sapiens], and 
other primates, for an intensely social life” (Haidt, 2004, p.286).  It should be noted however 
that the SIM has not been without its critics, for example Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004). 
Haidt’s SIM is social in that emphasizes the significance of social and cultural 
influences on moral judgment.  Social intuitions are learned gradually and implicitly by 
observation and imitation within the custom complexes of their socio-cultural setting, the 
latter providing a cultural “front end” for the somatic marker hypothesis (Haidt, 2001, p.828).  
Hence, moral intuitions are expressed differentially according to the culture in which they 
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occur, even though the underlying processes may be universal (Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007).  
Dane and Pratt (2009), commenting in relation to the cultural interactionist aspects of 
intuitionist moral judgment, noted that ‘smaller cultures’ such as those of organizations can 
also shape the moral and ethical codes of their members.  This can lead to individuals 
internalizing not only the moral values of a culture, but also the lack thereof, moreover 
members of organizations may also displace personal responsibility for their actions with 
behaviors commensurate with organizational or institutional norms and values (Sonenschein, 
2007) despite a moral instinct to the contrary. 
Information processing mechanisms.  Hauser (2006) attributed the roots of human 
morality to a number of innate, instinctive, and intuitive moral principles and processes 
which evolved as result of increased gregariousness in the shift towards living in relatively 
large social groups due to environmental changes (see Mithen, 1996).  The outcomes of 
moral intuiting express themselves differentially across cultures, and are linked inextricably 
to affect (‘gut feel’), often manifest in an inability to explicate one’s moral reasoning (so-
called ‘moral dumb-founding’, Haidt, 2001).  Thus moral judgment is more a matter of 
“emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning” (Greene & Haidt, 2002, p.517) 
governed by a universally-held sense of right and wrong (for example, Rawlsian principles of 
justice, or of fairness) the processes underlying which: (1) guide moral judgment 
automatically and rapidly but do not determine action; (2) are inaccessible to conscious 
awareness; (3) operate on real and imagined experiences; (4) require little or no instruction; 
(5) can be impaired as a result of damage to the neural circuitry which ‘hard-wires’ the moral 
instinct (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006).  In summary, moral intuitions draw on 
culturally variable moral systems which operate on a universal set of principles but which are 
honed to a set of moral norms based on prototypes, largely inaccessible and unconsciously 
operative, and which vary between socio-cultural complexes (Hauser, 2006). 
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Neural correlates: Emerging themes from the nascent field of ‘neuro-ethics’ suggest 
that preferences for certain normative approaches to ethical decisions are associated with 
particular structures and mechanisms in the human brain (including the medial orbito-frontal 
cortex, the amygdala, and the anterior cingulate) implicated in emotional processing 
(Salvador & Folger, 2009).  A preliminary functional neuro-anatomy of moral judgment 
suggests that no single brain region is devoted exclusively to it (Greene & Haidt, 2002), 
nonetheless impaired moral judgment has been observed in patients who have suffered 
damage to the ventro-medial region of the prefrontal cortex (VMPC) (Young & Koenigs, 
2007).  Normative moral judgment is also thought to involve interplay between the reflexive 
pattern-matching X-system (amygdala, VMPC, and basal ganglia), and the reflective, 
conscious reasoning C-system (Salvador & Folger, 2007) identified by Lieberman, Jarcho, 
and Satpute (1994).  In the case of moral intuition, the X-system functions on the basis of 
ethical or moral prototypes, described as “dynamic constructs holding descriptive, evaluative 
and prescriptive information in one configuration of neural network signals”, and results in a 
match or mismatch which may be further processed by the C-system (Reynolds, 2006, 
p.793). 
Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have argued that intuition should be conceptualized as a multi-
dimensional rather than a unitary construct comprised of a variety of general and specific 
mechanisms and processes, and primary types.  The term ‘primary type’ is adopted here in 
order to distinguish problem-solving, creative, social, and moral intuitions from composite 
forms of intuition.  The latter, which may be referred to as ‘secondary’ types, are analyzable 
in terms of primary types and are deployed in specific and non-recurrent (i.e. less frequently 
encountered) domains in occupational settings (e.g. business management, education, 
medicine, law, etc.).  For example, in the field of business and management researchers have 
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proposed ‘entrepreneurial intuition’ (Sadler-Smith, Hodgkinson, & Sinclair, 2008) which is 
composite to the extent that it draws on: (1) creative intuitions for the generation of new ideas 
(Kickul, et al., 2009); (2) problem-solving intuitions for the judgment of the viability of a 
business venturing proposition (Blume & Covin, 2010; Crossan, et al., 1999); (3) moral 
intuition in deciding whether or not to invest in a deal which may have an ethical component 
(Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2005); (4) social intuition in deciding who and who not to transact 
with (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000).  A corollary of this argument is that further secondary 
types may manifest in other applied areas such as healthcare, medicine, education, and law. 
The nature of intuition presents a particular set of methodological challenges for the 
documenting intuitive decision processes, capturing intuitive episodes, measuring individual 
differences in intuitive processing, and identifying the neural correlates of intuitive processes 
and outcomes (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2011).  From a dual-process perspective there 
are a number of valid and reliable instruments for the self-report measurement of individual 
differences in preferences for intuition in general (Betsch, 2008; Epstein et al., 1996).  The 
delineation of different types of intuition raises new challenges and opportunities, namely: 
examining relationships between extant measures of intuition; designing, developing, and 
validating more bespoke psychometric tools over-and-above individual differences in 
preferences for intuition, and for assessing intuition in its different guises.  Indeed, it may be 
advisable for intuition researchers to focus also on the assessment of performance in the 
various domains of intuition using task-based measures, for example, ethical and moral 
dilemmas or tacit knowledge tests (see Haidt, 2001; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). 
A more systematic program of phenomenological research might provide insights into 
the subjective nature experiences of intuition, using techniques such as critical incident 
technique (Flanagan, 1954), applied cognitive task analysis (Gore & McAndrew, 2009) 
experience sampling method (Csikszentmihalyi & Larsen 1987) (see Hodgkinson, Langan-
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Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 2008).  The elicitation of first-person accounts of intuitive episodes 
might also deploy the techniques of guided introspection based on psycho-phenomenological 
methods which have the potential to offer increased ‘granularity’ in the data (Vermersch, 
1999), and the analysis of primary metaphors primary metaphors that have a sensory-motor 
grounding in the body (Feldman, 2008).  Significant advances have been made in recent years 
in the use of brain imaging and this line of research is likely to continue to gain in momentum 
and make greater inroads into the study of intuitive processing in applied fields and 
occupational settings.  It is through the convergence of complementary lines of evidence from 
the behavioural, information processing, and neural levels of analysis that greatest progress is 
likely to be achieved (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012). 
The study of intuition has progressed to the extent that a number of mechanisms and 
processes of intuiting are identifiable, and as relevant developments in the evolutionary, 
brain, and behavioural sciences continue apace, the basic science upon which intuition 
researchers are able to draw will strengthen.  Much is to be gained through inter-disciplinary 
biological, social, and cultural inquiry, and intuition researchers can look forward to evidence 
for other processes and types of intuition emerging through on-going research in laboratory 
and field settings.  An improved understanding of the workings of a complex system of 
intuitive judgment and reasoning founded upon the extant and emerging evidence base from 
within the behavioural, brain, and evolutionary sciences has much to offer the applied study 
of intuitive decision processes in laboratory and organizational field settings. 
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Figure 1.  Conceptual framework (Note: CDRS, complex domain-relevant schemas; ToM, theory of mind) 
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Table 1. 
Distinctions between and within intuiting and intuition 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Intuiting Domain-general 
cognitive and 
affective 
mechanisms of 
intuiting 
Fundamental aspects of human learning, reasoning and 
judgment which operate across domains; 
Evoked automatically on the basis of the specific 
characteristics (e.g. complexity, riskiness and uncertainty) 
of the eliciting task (i.e. the ‘trigger’ for non-deliberative 
processing); 
1. Build complex domain-relevant schemas (via 
explicit and implicit learning); 
2. Provide affective ‘data’ (e.g. manifest as somatic 
markers); 
3. Give rise to rapid judgments which may be subject 
to intuitive errors (on the basis of heuristics and 
biases). 
Domain-specific 
processes 
Activated autonomously on the basis of: 
1. Characteristics of recurrent (i.e. more frequently 
encountered) domains in which the task is located; 
2. Learned patterns, schemas and prototypes 
Intuitions Primary types of 
intuition 
Outcomes of intuiting reducible only to information 
processing mechanisms and their neural correlates in the 
recurrent domains of: 
1. Problem-solving; 
2. Creativity; 
3. Moral judgment; 
4. Social judgment 
Secondary types Composite forms of intuition; analyzable in terms of and 
reducible to, primary types; deployed in specific and non-
recurrent (i.e. less frequently encountered) domains in 
occupational settings, e.g. entrepreneurial intuition in 
business management 
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Table 2. 
Primary types of intuition: behavioral, information processing and neural descriptions 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Primary 
Type 
Behavioral Description Information 
Processing 
Mechanisms 
Neural correlates 
Problem-
solving 
intuition 
Domain-specific, expertise-based 
response to a tightly-structured 
problem based on non-conscious 
processing of information, activated 
automatically, eliciting matching of 
complex patterns of multiple cues 
against previously acquired prototypes 
and scripts held in long-term memory. 
Pattern 
recognition and 
matching; Action 
scripts; Mental 
simulation 
Orbito-frontal 
cortex; Ventral 
occipito-temporal 
regions; Posterior 
hippocampus. 
Creative 
intuition 
Slow-to-form affectively-charged 
judgment occurring in advance of an 
insight that combines knowledge in 
novel ways based on divergent 
associations, and which orients 
behavior in a direction that may lead 
to a creative outcome. 
Spreading 
activation; 
Incubation; 
Insight 
Diffuse neural 
networks; Anterior 
superior temporal 
gyrus 
Social 
intuition 
Rapid and automatic evaluation of 
another person’s cognitive and/or 
affective state through the perception 
and non-conscious processing of 
verbal and/or non-verbal indicators. 
Thin slicing; 
Theory of Mind; 
Empathic 
perception and 
judgment 
Lateral temporal 
cortex; Von 
Economo Neurons; 
Mirror neurons 
Moral 
intuition 
Automatic, rapid, affect-based 
judgment made in response to an 
ethical dilemma, arrived at non-
consciously, rationalized post-hoc, and 
relatively impervious to 
disconfirmation. 
Social-intuitionist 
principles; Moral 
prototypes 
Ventro-medial 
prefrontal cortex 
and related X-
system substrates 
_________________________________________________________________________
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